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Abstract 
How do firms manage to collude without communicating? Why do we find more collusion in 
price competition than in quantity competition? Why is collusion so hard to detect? We 
examine strategic behavior in competitive interactions by developing and applying the 
concept of virtual bargaining. When decision makers virtually bargain, they mentally 
simulate, and choose among, agreements that they could reach if they were able to explicitly 
negotiate with each other. Virtual bargainers focus on agreements that offer some protection 
against the possibility that their counterparts may deviate and best-respond to these 
agreements. We develop a formal account of virtual bargaining and demonstrate that it leads 
to collusion in Bertrand, but not in Cournot competition. In this framework, collusion is a 
result of virtual bargaining as a mode of reasoning and requires neither communication nor 
dynamic considerations, such as rewards and punishments, between the players. 
Keywords: virtual bargaining, collusion, Games-Group Decisions   
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1. Introduction 
Anti-trust authorities are increasingly prioritizing the detection and punishment of price-
fixing. However, it is often very difficult to find concrete proof of wrong-doing “with 
evidence hard to spot from the outside” (The Economist, 2016). It appears that collusion 
frequently occurs with minimal or no communication among competitors. Recent reports 
suggest that even in online markets—where sellers are decentralized and may not know one 
another—there are often unspoken agreements not to undercut prices (The Sunday Times, 
2016). Anti-trust authorities typically need evidence of explicit discussion to punish colluding 
competitors. Therefore, unspoken agreements are particularly problematic. How is such 
collusion possible? Why is it so hard to detect? 
The problem of collusion is, of course, long standing. In a famous passage in The 
Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1937: 128) notes that “People of the same trade seldom 
meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” We suspect that the problem of 
unspoken agreements also has a long history. Such agreements, while intuitively plausible, 
may seem incompatible with basic theory: collusion in oligopolistic markets without 
communication does not easily follow from Nash equilibrium, and hence is difficult to 
analyze using standard game-theoretical tools. Finding direct evidence for the operation of 
unspoken collusive agreements in real markets is inevitably difficult, precisely because they 
are unspoken. But the existence of unspoken agreements is consistent with evidence from 
experimental markets, where participants’ behavior often diverges from Nash predictions. 
This phenomenon is especially pronounced for competition in prices, an anomaly that has 
been coined the “Bertrand paradox” (e.g., Engel, 2007; Fatas, Haruvy, & Morales, 2014; 
Friedman, 1977; Kreps & Scheinkman, 1983; Suetens & Potters, 2007). Moreover, puzzling 
collusive behavior exists even in the absence of learning and experience effects (Dufwenberg 
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& Gneezy, 2000). The divergence between Nash predictions and observed behavior is much 
smaller or non-existent when firms compete in quantities (see Potters & Suetens, 2013 for an 
overview). 
The present paper offers a novel explanation for collusive behavior in oligopolistic 
markets. We build on a concept of strategic behavior called virtual bargaining (Misyak, 
Melkonyan, Zeitoun, & Chater, 2014), originally developed to model joint action and 
communication in cognitive science. The human ability to engage in virtual bargaining 
suggests that actors merely need to imagine a bargaining process: they can directly 
implement the results of a purely “virtual bargain,” without actually needing to communicate, 
when it is clear what the outcome of such a conversation would be. Crucially, this is possible 
even in one-shot interactions in the absence of learning and reputation effects. According to 
the virtual bargaining viewpoint, Smith’s concern that sellers’ conversations soon turn to 
collusion against the consumer can be broadened. Collusive behavior may occur even if the 
conversation can merely be imagined. 
More concretely, we propose a formal definition of a virtual bargaining equilibrium 
that helps explain how players may coordinate on collusive outcomes. According to this 
theory, players identify agreements that they could potentially reach if they could enter into 
binding contracts (we use “agreement” and “strategy profile” interchangeably). They realize, 
however, that given the nature of their interaction, these agreements are not enforceable. 
Specifically, for each possible agreement, each player considers two scenarios for the 
opponent’s behavior. Under the first scenario, the opponent sticks to the agreement, whereas 
under the second, she2 best-responds to the agreement. 
The players perceive strategic uncertainty as to which of these two options the 
opponent will choose. To model attitudes to strategic uncertainty, we suppose that the players 
                                                 
2 We refer to the opponent as “she”. 
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are strategically pessimistic: each player uses the lowest of the payoffs under these two 
scenarios, called the worst payoff, to guide his behavior. This behavior can be rationalized 
using the maximin model of ambiguity aversion (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989). A player 
retains a strategy profile (called “feasible agreement”) if its worst payoff cannot be improved 
by a unilateral change of strategy. Formally, it turns out that the set of feasible agreements is 
equivalent to the set of Nash equilibria on the worst payoffs (as opposed to the payoffs). The 
set of feasible agreements contains all Nash equilibria, and often includes additional strategy 
profiles. After identifying the set of feasible agreements via a mental simulation, the players 
envisage a bargaining process and choose a strategy profile from the set of possible feasible 
agreements. The strategy profile selected via this procedure is called the virtual bargaining 
equilibrium. It exists under standard regularity conditions and, in many games, the set of 
virtual bargaining and Nash equilibria differ. 
The rationale for the virtual bargaining equilibrium can be illustrated in a domain that 
we do not directly consider here: the puzzling question of the justification of mixed-strategy 
Nash equilibria. Consider the game of Matching Pennies, where each of two players chooses 
Heads, Tails or a mixed strategy (i.e., selecting a probability of choosing each option). One of 
the players receives a payoff of 1 if the pennies match and a payoff of -1 if they do not match, 
whereas the other player receives a payoff of -1 in the case of a match and a payoff of 1 in the 
case of a non-match. Here, the equilibrium is that both players choose heads and tails with 
probability ½. But if Player 1 chooses this mixed strategy, Player 2 can costlessly choose any 
strategy (including playing Heads with probability 1). But if Player 2 chooses any other 
strategy, Player 1’s ½, ½ strategy is not a best response. So there appears to be something 
unstable about the justification of both players playing the mixed strategy: if one does so, the 
other need not, and then the next iteration of reasoning leads to a pure (non-probabilistic) 
strategy. 
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This puzzle disappears when one adopts a virtual bargaining point of view.3 That is, if 
we ask, “Which feasible agreements are there in matching pennies?” the answer is that there 
is just one, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium profile. From a virtual bargaining 
perspective, this agreement is stable because if each player follows it, their worst expected 
payoff is 0 (irrespective of any “best response” the other makes—of course, here all 
responses from the other are tied). Any other agreement has a strictly smaller worst payoff 
(e.g., if Player 1 agrees to play Heads, then whatever the Player 2 might supposedly agree, 
her best response—say Tails—will lead me to a certain loss.) 
Both players can reason that the mixed-strategy agreement is the only one that they 
can credibly achieve (any opponent who promises that they will play a specific move can 
only be attempting to bluff, or double-, or triple-… bluff). According to virtual bargaining, 
each player is confident that she herself will follow the “bargain” (here: the mixed strategy), 
whether or not the other does. Thus, in contrast to Nash reasoning, players strictly prefer 
mixed strategies under virtual bargaining reasoning, not just in Matching Pennies, but more 
generally. Thus, virtual bargaining provides a simple justification for mixed-strategy 
equilibria, as an alternative to highly sophisticated and controversial proposals in the 
literature, such as “purification” (Harsanyi, 1973). 
Here, we use the virtual bargaining equilibrium in a different context: to explain and 
predict the potential for collusive behavior in Bertrand competition (i.e., firms compete on 
prices) and Cournot competition (i.e., firms compete on quantities). These two models of 
competition are central to understanding markets and business strategies (e.g., Cabral & 
Villas-Boas, 2005). Our predictions require neither communication nor dynamic 
                                                 
3 In the matching pennies game, and in constant-sum games more generally, by playing a mixed strategy a 
player minimizes the opponent’s ability to distinguish and exploit systematic patterns of behavior.  
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considerations (for collusion in a dynamic environment, see, e.g., Campbell, Ray, & 
Muhanna, 2005). 
Consider Bertrand competition with differentiated goods and two players (Singh & 
Vives, 1984; Stigler, 1964). Suppose that each player envisions a collusive virtual agreement 
involving higher prices. Each player realizes that the opponent will have an incentive to 
choose a price below the collusive level. In spite of the possibility of this deviation, the 
collusive outcome is more attractive than Nash—both players may make high profits even if 
one deviates from the agreement and undercuts the other. Moreover, there exists an 
agreement which each player finds more attractive, in terms of her worst payoff, than all 
agreements resulting from her own deviations. This agreement involves a higher price than 
the Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus, virtual bargaining enables the players to collude and 
achieve higher profits than in the Nash equilibrium. 
To gain further insights into this finding, consider the “Traveler’s Dilemma” game 
(Basu, 1994). In this game, two players simultaneously and independently choose a sum of 
money, e.g., an integer sum between $1 and $100. Both players receive the lower of the two 
sums; then $2 is transferred from the player who gave the “greedier” offer to the player with 
the more “modest” offer (no transfer occurs if both players propose the same sum of money). 
This means that each player’s best response is to slightly undercut the other; and an inductive 
argument leads to a single Nash equilibrium: that both players choose $1, and receive this 
very low payoff. Thus, although both players have a great deal to gain from coordinating on a 
high number (e.g., by both choosing $100), the Nash equilibrium predicts that this 
opportunity will be lost. Collusion in this game amounts to choosing a higher sum of money. 
As might intuitively be expected, in experiments, people are often able to coordinate, 
reasonably effectively, to obtain high payoffs in this game (Capra, Goeree, Gomez, & Holt, 
1999). Consider a virtual agreement that stipulates both players to choose $100. If a player 
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sticks to this agreement, and her opponent either follows the agreement or best-responds to it, 
then the least that she can get is $97. This worst payoff of the strategy profile ($100,$100) is 
thus much more attractive than a payoff of $1 under the Nash equilibrium. It is also more 
attractive than other potential collusive agreements. Thus, virtual bargaining leads to 
collusion at the highest possible level in this game (i.e., full collusion). In Bertrand 
competition, however, we show that the virtual bargaining equilibrium lies strictly between 
the Nash equilibrium and the price vector that maximizes the total of the two players’ profits. 
Thus, virtual bargaining leads to partial collusion. 
The reasoning that enables the players to collude in Traveler’s Dilemma and Bertrand 
competition has similarities. In both cases, the incentive to undercut the other player exists, 
but it is not too detrimental to the opponent. Moreover, if one player chooses a higher 
price/number, the opponent’s best response is to choose a higher price/number as well (but 
not to the same degree), thus moving in the direction of a collusive outcome. As a result, 
there exists a strategy profile that improves upon Nash and offers some protection against the 
possibility that the opponent may deviate and best-respond to the agreement.  
In contrast, virtual bargaining does not have a bite in Cournot competition. If one of 
the players contemplates a reduction in quantity, she realizes that it will be met by an 
offsetting increase in the opponent’s quantity, if the latter chooses to best-respond. Thus, 
when one of the players considers moving toward a more collusive outcome, she realizes that 
the opponent will move in the direction of higher market dominance. In contrast to Bertrand 
competition and the Traveler’s Dilemma game, Cournot competition is not conducive to 
collusive behavior. 
Our analysis of implicit collusion envisions collusive behavior as emerging 
spontaneously and implicitly. Unlike explicit regulations or laws, the implicit agreements that 
guide social and economic behavior are typically not written down or subject to formal 
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sanction. People appear, nonetheless, to be averse to violating implicit agreements. This 
aversion has been observed in “breaching” experiments where people are instructed to violate 
everyday social rules (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967; Milgram & Sabini, 1978). Such aversion may be 
amplified where there is explicit consent to an agreement, e.g., through an unenforceable 
“handshake” (Kessler & Leider, 2012). Indeed, the desire to conform to implicit agreements 
can motivate behavior (Krupka, Leider, & Jiang, 2017). Moreover, the tendency to follow 
implicit agreements tends to “spill over” between contexts (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). 
Implicit agreements may do more than guide behavior merely by imposing additional costs 
and benefits in a conventional utility-maximizing analysis. According to March and Olsen’s 
(2008) influential theory, such agreements have an entirely separate “logic” for guiding 
action (for example, according to deontological, rather than consequentialist theories of 
ethics, see Kamm, 2007).  
While following implicit agreements can be seen as a foundation for virtue, it can also 
operate against the public interest, as in the case of collusion. Here, the implicit nature of the 
agreement may be particularly advantageous for colluding parties, because an explicit 
agreement might violate the law. In cases where it is “obvious” to both parties that following 
the agreement (e.g., keeping prices high) will be mutually beneficial, explicit agreement may 
not be required. Both parties may know what they would agree, if they were able secretly to 
communicate.  
 
2. Virtual bargaining equilibrium 
Consider a game between two players, 1 and 2, who simultaneously and independently 
choose their strategies 𝜎1 ∈ Σ1 and 𝜎2 ∈ Σ2.
4 Let 𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎−𝑖)  denote player 𝑖’s (𝑖 = 1,2) 
                                                 
4 We define the notion of a virtual bargaining equilibrium for normal form games with arbitrary number of 
players elsewhere. 
10 
 
payoff function, where player 𝑖’s opponent is denoted by – 𝑖 and the latter’s strategy is 
denoted by 𝜎−𝑖. We define the worst payoff of an agreement (𝜎1
𝐴, 𝜎2
𝐴) for player 𝑖 = 1,2 as 
the worst case scenario of two possibilities; (i) player 𝑖’s opponent goes through with the 
agreement by playing her part of the strategy profile (𝜎1
𝐴, 𝜎2
𝐴) and (ii) best responds to 𝜎𝑖
𝐴. 
Formally, the worst payoff of an agreement (𝜎1
𝐴, 𝜎2
𝐴) is given by  
(1) 𝑤𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐴, 𝜎−𝑖
𝐴 ) = min {𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐴, 𝜎−𝑖
𝐴 ), sup
𝜎−𝑖∈𝑅−𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐴)
𝑢𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐴, 𝜎−𝑖)}, 
where 𝑅−𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐴) denotes the set of player −𝑖’s best responses to strategy 𝜎𝑖
𝐴. Thus, player 𝑖 
allows for the possibility that player −𝑖 will deviate from the agreement (𝜎𝑖
𝐴, 𝜎−𝑖
𝐴 ) and play a 
best response to strategy 𝜎𝑖
𝐴. Note that player 𝑖 also believes that among all such best 
responses, player −𝑖 will choose the best-response which yields player 𝑖 the highest payoff. 
In other words, each player believes that even if her opponent deviates from an agreement, 
she will not do so in a spiteful fashion. This assumption is common in many strategic 
environments. Examples include bargaining models, principal-agent models and ultimatum 
games. In these environments, the party that receives an offer is indifferent between 
accepting and refusing it, but chooses the former which, in turn, benefits the party making the 
offer. The assumption of non-spitefulness ensures that the set of feasible agreements includes 
all Nash equilibria. However, this assumption does not influence the analytical results in the 
present paper, because in Cournot and Bertrand games the best response to any strategy is 
unique. 
The players will be guided by worst payoffs if they have ambiguous beliefs about the 
strategies that their opponents will play and if their preference functional has Gilboa and 
Schmeidler’s (1989) maximin expected utility form. Suppose that for each strategy profile 
each player entertains two possibilities for his opponent’s behavior; “the agreement is 
honored” and “the opponent best responds in a non-spiteful fashion”.  Suppose also that each 
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player has completely ambiguous beliefs about which of these two strategies will be played 
by the opponent (or, equivalently, each player considers each possible probability distribution 
over these two strategies). If a player with such beliefs has maximin expected utility 
preferences, then his preference functional will be given by (1).5   
Each player thinks of all strategy profiles as possible agreements that she could strike 
with her opponent and for each such agreement her choices are guided by the worst payoff. 
The two players narrow down the set of all possible agreements and retain the agreements 
where neither player can improve her worst payoff by a unilateral deviation. We call these 
agreements “feasible.” Formally, we will say that an agreement (𝜎𝑖
𝐹 , 𝜎−𝑖
𝐹 ) is feasible if, for all 
𝑖 ∈ {1,2}, 
(2)     𝑤𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐹 , 𝜎−𝑖
𝐹 ) ≥ 𝑤𝑖(?̃?𝑖, 𝜎−𝑖
𝐹 ) for all ?̃?𝑖 ∈ Σ𝑖. 
The intuition is that a feasible agreement (𝜎1
𝐹 , 𝜎2
𝐹) is an arrangement that the two players 
could both credibly have reached if there is no bargain (?̃?1, 𝜎2
𝐹) that would have a better 
“worst payoff” for player 1; and similarly there is no bargain (𝜎1
𝐹, ?̃?2) that would have a 
better “worst payoff” for player 2. Thus, each player uses the worst payoff function both 
when the player considers following an agreement and when she considers deviating from it. 
If an agreement is not feasible then the two players discard it as a possible mode of behavior 
because at least one of the players has a more attractive alternative agreement (from the 
perspective of her worst payoff).  
In a world where players focus on “payoffs,” unilateral deviations imply that players 
are looking for higher individual payoffs: such deviations can potentially lead to exploitation 
of the other player. In a world where players focus on “worst payoffs,” however, unilateral 
deviations have a different meaning. The question is not whether each player can deviate by 
best-responding, thereby potentially exploiting the other player. Instead, the players consider 
                                                 
5 We are indebted to the Department Editor for suggesting this interpretation of the worst payoffs. 
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unilateral deviations to figure out whether there is a more attractive agreement for them than 
the focal agreement. 
Let 𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝜎−𝑖) ≡ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝜎𝑖∈Σ𝑖  𝑤𝑖(𝜎𝑖, 𝜎−𝑖) denote player i’s best-response 
correspondence for the worst payoff function. Using this notation, the agreement (𝜎𝑖
𝐹 , 𝜎−𝑖
𝐹 ) is 
feasible if and only if   
(3)      𝜎𝑖
𝐹 ∈ 𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝜎−𝑖) for all 𝑖 ∈ {1,2}. 
Thus, our notion of a feasible agreement is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium, but in 
a world of “worst payoffs” rather than “payoffs.” That is, feasible agreements ensure that no 
“more attractive” agreements are attainable through unilateral deviation. Therefore, it seems 
that for both players to consider a strategy profile as a candidate for a virtual bargain, it has to 
be feasible.  
Note that a game may have multiple feasible agreements. We let 𝐹 denote the set of 
feasible agreements. It follows immediately from the definition in (1) that any Nash 
equilibrium (NE) is a feasible agreement. However, there may be feasible agreements that 
violate the Nash requirements. 
We use the symmetric game of Table 1 to demonstrate the concepts introduced 
above.6 Table 1.a contains the normal form of the game while Table 1.b contains the worst 
payoffs for all pure-strategy profiles. In this game, each player i = 1, 2 has three pure 
strategies; H, L, and N. The set of pure-strategy feasible agreements consists only of the Nash 
equilibrium strategy profile (𝑁,𝑁). In addition, the game has a feasible agreement in mixed 
strategies where each player plays strategy 𝐻 with probability 
6
7
 and strategy 𝑁 with 
probability 
1
7
. To demonstrate that the latter strategy profile, which is denoted by 
                                                 
6 It is straightforward to verify that, similarly to Bertrand competition, the game of Table 1 is supermodular 
(Milgrom & Shannon, 1994; Topkis, 2011). 
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((𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
) , (𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
)), is a feasible agreement, we verify that 
sup
𝜎−𝑖∈𝑅−𝑖((𝐻,
6
7
;𝑁,
1
7
))
𝑢𝑖 ((𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
) , 𝜎−𝑖) = 34. Since 𝑢𝑖 ((𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
) , (𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
)) = 50. 3, the 
worst payoff for the strategy profile ((𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
) , (𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
)) is equal to 34. One can also 
demonstrate that any unilateral deviation from this agreement yields a worst payoff which is 
(weakly) smaller than 34. Thus, ((𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
) , (𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
)) is feasible. Moreover, this 
strategy profile is the only feasible agreement in addition to the Nash equilibrium (𝑁,𝑁).  
 
Table 1. Illustrative Game 
a. Normal form of the game                               b. Worst payoffs for pure strategies  
  Player 2   Player 2 
  H L N   H L N 
 
Player 1 
 
H (60, 60) (33, 62) (-10, 61)  H (33, 33) (33, -6) (-10, 0) 
L (62, 33) (36, 36) (-6, 40) Player 1 L (-6, 33) (-6, -6) (-6, 0) 
N (61, -10) (40, -6) (0, 0)  N (0, -10) (0, -6) (0, 0) 
 
The example in Table 1 also illustrates that the support of feasible agreements may 
include strictly dominated strategies. The strategy 𝐻 is strictly dominated by the strategy 𝐿 
for both players. However, 𝐻 is played with probability 
6
7
 in the mixed strategy feasible 
agreement.   
The rationale for virtual bargaining, which we explained in the introduction, implies 
that the players entertain the possibility that the opponent will stick to the bargain and play 𝐻. 
Given that virtual bargainers may not best-respond and may even play strictly dominated 
strategies, one might refer to virtual bargaining as a form of “bounded rationality.” Within 
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economics, bounded rationality is sometimes used as a general term for non-standard, 
behavioral accounts to explain experimental findings “while retaining precision and cross-
game generality” (Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2003: 194). In cognitive science, however, 
“bounded rationality” can generate misleading associations. Inspired by Herbert Simon, 
cognitive scientists typically use bounded rationality to refer to approximations to rational 
processes, which are “bounded” by computational limitations. Although virtual bargaining 
makes assumptions that deviate from Nash reasoning, it does not assume computational 
restrictions. Instead, virtual bargaining assumes that players think of strategy profiles as 
possible agreements and associate “worst payoffs,” instead of “payoffs,” with these 
agreements. 
What are the “rationality” properties of virtual bargaining? Virtual bargaining differs 
from the “rationality” assumptions underpinning the Nash equilibrium in the following ways. 
First, virtual bargains may involve strictly dominated strategies in terms of payoffs (but not in 
terms of “worst payoffs”). According to some strict conceptions of rationality (especially 
prevalent in standard game theory), choosing any dominated option must necessarily be 
irrational. However, examples of strategic interactions (e.g., the Traveler’s Dilemma, the 
Centipede Game, and Newcomb’s Problem) have been taken, by some, to imply that this 
criterion of rationality has some paradoxical consequences. Be that as it may, many theorists 
may view virtual bargaining as departing from strict rationality on these grounds. 
Second, as in, for example, level-k reasoning, virtual bargaining involves inconsistent 
beliefs to some degree. On the one hand, each player considers two possibilities for each 
strategy profile: the other player will either stick to the bargain or best-respond to it. On the 
other hand, each player knows for certain whether they themselves will follow the bargain or 
best-respond. As discussed above, this “inconsistency”—or “asymmetry”—is similar to that 
in real bargaining. This is a different type of inconsistency than in level-k reasoning, where 
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each player assumes that their counterpart uses a lower level of reasoning than they do 
themselves. 
When making their choices, the two players simulate a bargaining process that, given 
the players’ status quo positions, chooses one of the feasible agreements. The status quo 
position for each player in the bargaining process is given by her worst payoff from a feasible 
agreement that is worst for him. Formally, player 𝑖’s fallback position is defined as 𝑤𝑖
𝑚 =
min
(𝜎1
𝐹,𝜎2
𝐹)∈𝐹
𝑤𝑖(𝜎1
𝐹 , 𝜎2
𝐹). In what follows, we will call 𝑤𝑖
𝑚 the minimum feasible worst payoff of 
player 𝑖. Note that for certain games, for example in the Battle of the Sexes game, 
∄(𝜎1
𝐹 , 𝜎2
𝐹) ∈ 𝐹 such that 
(𝑤1
𝑚, 𝑤2
𝑚) = (𝑤1(𝜎1
𝐹, 𝜎2
𝐹),𝑤2(𝜎1
𝐹 , 𝜎2
𝐹)). 
That is, the minimum feasible worst payoffs of the two players may correspond to different 
feasible agreements. If the game has a unique feasible agreement then both players receive 
their minimum feasible worst payoffs from playing the unique feasible agreement. In this 
case, the latter characterizes the status quo positions of both players. 
The bargaining mechanism used to choose a virtual bargain is the Nash bargaining 
solution7 where the players’ status quo positions are their minimum feasible worst payoffs. 
Formally, a virtual bargaining equilibrium (VBE) (𝜎1
𝑉 , 𝜎2
𝑉) is a feasible agreement that 
maximizes the product of differences between the players’ worst payoffs under this strategy 
pair and the worst payoffs from the status quo subject to the constraint that both players’ 
payoffs exceed their respective status quo payoffs: 
(4) (𝜎1
𝑉, 𝜎2
𝑉) ∈ argmax
(𝜎1
𝐹,𝜎2
𝐹)∈𝐹
∏ (𝑤𝑖(𝜎𝑖
𝐹 , 𝜎−𝑖
𝐹 ) − 𝑤𝑖
𝑚)2𝑖=1 . 
Note also that for simplicity we have assumed that the two players have equal 
bargaining powers. Our definition of the virtual bargaining equilibrium can be readily 
                                                 
7 One could allow for alternative bargaining mechanisms to arrive at the virtual bargain.  
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extended to the general case of arbitrary bargaining powers. Although the analysis is 
straightforward for the general case, for the purposes of compact notation, we maintain the 
assumption of equal bargaining powers throughout the paper. It follows immediately from the 
definition of the virtual bargaining equilibrium that under standard regularity conditions on 
the sets Σ𝑖 and the payoff functions 𝑢𝑖(∙,∙), the game has a virtual bargaining equilibrium. By 
the definition of the Nash bargaining solution, any virtual bargaining equilibrium will be 
Pareto optimal (with respect to the players’ worst payoffs) among the set of feasible 
agreements. Moreover, any virtual bargaining equilibrium is Pareto undominated by any 
Nash equilibrium. At the same time, a game may have a strategy profile which is not feasible 
and whose payoff vector Pareto dominates (with respect to the players’ payoffs) all feasible 
agreements. Prisoners’ Dilemma is an example of such game. Thus, our equilibrium notion is 
different from both Nash equilibrium and Pareto criterion (with respect to the players’ 
payoffs). 
Returning to the example of Table 1, note that the worst payoff of 34 from the feasible 
agreement ((𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
) , (𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
)) exceeds the minimum feasible payoff of 0. It then 
follows immediately from (4) that ((𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
) , (𝐻,
6
7
; 𝑁,
1
7
)) is the unique virtual bargaining 
equilibrium.8 If both players follow through with this agreement then they can significantly 
improve their payoffs compared to the Nash payoff of 0. 
We now analyze Cournot and Bertrand competition in turn using virtual bargaining. 
The analysis provides a possible explanation why collusion arises so much more readily in 
the latter competitive environment.  
 
3. Cournot competition 
                                                 
8 This holds for any distribution of bargaining powers among the players. 
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Consider the following Cournot game with two firms, 𝑖 = 1, 2, each producing output 𝑞𝑖 ∈
ℝ+. We assume that the firms have constant marginal costs.
9 Without any further loss of 
generality, these marginal costs are set equal to zero. The inverse demand functions for the 
two firms’ products are given by  
𝑝1 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞1 − 𝛾𝑞2   and   𝑝2 = 𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞2 − 𝛾𝑞1, 
where 𝛼 > 𝛽 ≥ 𝛾 > 0. Thus, the goods produced by the two firms are substitutes and each 
firm 𝑖’s profit function is 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) = (𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞𝑖 − 𝛾𝑞−𝑖)𝑞𝑖. The output choices are made by 
the two firms simultaneously and independently. Since 
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑞1𝜕𝑞2
= −𝛾 < 0, the firms’ outputs 
are strategic substitutes (Bulow, Geanakoplos, & Klemperer, 1985; Topkis, 2011).   
Firm 𝑖’s best response to output 𝑞−𝑖 is given by 𝑅𝑖(𝑞−𝑖) =
𝛼−𝛾𝑞−𝑖
2𝛽
. The unique Nash 
equilibrium is given by 𝑞1
𝑁 = 𝑞2
𝑁 =
𝛼
2𝛽+𝛾
. The output combination that maximizes the joint of 
the two firms’ profits is given by 𝑞1
∗ = 𝑞2
∗ =
𝛼
2𝛽+2𝛾
. We will refer to the latter output 
combination as the collusive outcome. 
The worst payoff of an agreement (𝑞1, 𝑞2) for firm 𝑖 = 1,2 is given by 
(5) 𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) = min {𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖), sup
𝑞−𝑖
′ ∈𝑅−𝑖(𝑞𝑖)
𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖
′ )} =
min{𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖), 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖 , 𝑅−𝑖(𝑞𝑖))} = {
(𝛼 − 𝛽𝑞𝑖 − 𝛾𝑞−𝑖)𝑞𝑖, 𝑖𝑓 𝑞𝑖 >
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
((2𝛽−𝛾)𝛼−(2𝛽2−𝛾2)𝑞𝑖)𝑞𝑖
2𝛽
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑞𝑖 ≤
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
. 
Thus, when the weighted average of two players’ quantities is large, player 𝑖’s worst payoff 
for (𝑞1, 𝑞2) is equal to profit 𝜋𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) for the scenario where the opponent follows her part 
of the agreement. Conversely, when the weighted average is small, player 𝑖’s worst payoff is 
                                                 
9 Our assumptions of constant marginal costs and linear demands are made to save on notation and to facilitate 
illustration of the virtual bargaining equilibrium. Our main findings hold for a general Cournot model with 
standard assumptions on the demand and cost functions. The same comment applies to the model of Bertrand 
competition. 
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equal to profit for the scenario where the opponent best responds. This property of the worst 
payoff function is intuitive. An agreement is relatively attractive when the market is not 
saturated. In this case, a best-response by an opponent will have a detrimental effect on a 
player relative to the payoff from the agreement.  Conversely, when the market is saturated, 
the agreement itself is relatively unattractive and an opponent’s best-response to the 
agreement has a positive impact on a player.  
We demonstrate in Appendix that the best-response function of player 𝑖 for payoff 
function 𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) is given by  
(6) 𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝑞−𝑖) =
{
 
 
 
 
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛼
2(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑞−𝑖 ≤
𝛼
2𝛽
−
𝛼(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛾
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
              
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
,      𝑖𝑓 
𝛼
2𝛽
−
𝛼(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛾
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
< 𝑞−𝑖 <
𝛼
2𝛽+𝛾
𝛼−𝛾𝑞−𝑖
2𝛽
,        𝑖𝑓 𝑞−𝑖 ≥
𝛼
2𝛽+𝛾
 . 
Thus, the best-response function 𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝑞−𝑖) is constant for relatively small values of 𝑞−𝑖 and 
decreasing afterwards. The functions 𝑅1
𝐹(𝑞2) and 𝑅2
𝐹(𝑞1) are given by the kinked lines that 
pass through points ADNEG and BENDH, respectively, in Figure 1. Point C in Figure 1 
represents the collusive output combination (𝑞1
∗, 𝑞2
∗) while point N represents the Nash 
equilibrium (𝑞1
𝑁, 𝑞2
𝑁). 
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From the definition of a feasible agreement in (3), an agreement (𝑞1
𝐹, 𝑞2
𝐹) is feasible if 
and only if 𝑞𝑖
𝐹 ∈ 𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝑞−𝑖
𝐹 ) for 𝑖 = 1,2. It follows immediately from this fact and (6) that the 
set of feasible agreements for the Cournot game is given by:  
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𝐹 = {(𝑞1, 𝑞2): 𝑞2 =
𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑞1
𝛾
,
𝛼
2𝛽
−
𝛼(2𝛽 − 𝛾)𝛾
4𝛽(2𝛽2 − 𝛾2)
≤ 𝑞1 ≤
𝛼
2𝛽 + 𝛾
}
∪ {(𝑞1, 𝑞2): 𝑞1 =
𝛼 − 2𝛽𝑞2
𝛾
,
𝛼
2𝛽
−
𝛼(2𝛽 − 𝛾)𝛾
4𝛽(2𝛽2 − 𝛾2)
≤ 𝑞2 ≤
𝛼
2𝛽 + 𝛾
}. 
The set 𝐹 is given by the union of the line segments EN and ND in Figure 1, which 
correspond to the first and second elements of the above union.  
Using (4) we obtain that the unique virtual bargaining equilibrium coincides with the 
Nash equilibrium (point N in Figure 1).10 We summarize our findings in the following: 
 
Proposition 1:  The unique VB equilibrium of the Cournot game coincides with the NE. 
 
The intuition why the VB collapses to Nash is as follows. Suppose that the players consider 
reducing their outputs below the Nash level. Due to strategic substitutability between the 
players’ choices, each player realizes that if she decreases her output and the opponent 
foresees the reduction, the latter player will compensate for the reduction by increasing her 
own output; and the more a player decreases her own output, the more the opponent will 
compensate by increasing her output. Hence, the worst payoff associated with smaller outputs 
will be determined by the scenario where the opponent increases her output by best-
responding. This, however, is a relatively unattractive scenario since the decrease in output is 
met by a non-collusive output increase by the opponent. Formally, an agreement with outputs 
which are lower than the Nash level for both players is not feasible. As a result, the VB 
equilibrium coincides with the NE. 
 
                                                 
10 Note that if we relaxed the assumption of equal bargaining power between the players, then the VB 
equilibrium could be an agreement in the set 𝐹 which was different from the Nash equilibrium.  
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4. Bertrand competition 
Virtual bargaining and Nash behavior are different when firms compete in prices. Consider 
the following Bertrand game with linear demand functions. There are two firms, 𝑖 = 1, 2, in 
the market each producing output 𝑞𝑖 ∈ ℝ+ and selling its output at price 𝑝𝑖 ∈ ℝ+. As in 
Cournot competition, the firms have constant marginal costs which are normalized to zero. 
The direct demand functions for the two firms’ products are given by 
𝑞1 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝1 + 𝑐𝑝2  and   𝑞2 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝2 + 𝑐𝑝1, 
where 𝑏 ≥ 𝑐 > 0. Thus, the goods sold by the two firms are substitutes. Each firm 𝑖’s profit 
function can be written as 𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝−𝑖) = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑖 + 𝑐𝑝−𝑖)𝑝𝑖. The prices are chosen by the 
two firms simultaneously and independently. Since 
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝1𝜕𝑝2
= 𝑐 > 0, the prices of the two 
firms are strategic complements.   
Firm 𝑖’s best response to price 𝑝−𝑖 is given by 𝑅𝑖(𝑝−𝑖) =
𝑎+𝑐𝑝−𝑖
2𝑏
. The unique Nash 
equilibrium is given by 𝑝𝑁 ≡ 𝑝1
𝑁 = 𝑝2
𝑁 =
𝑎
2𝑏−𝑐
. The Nash equilibrium output is given by 
𝑞𝑁 ≡ 𝑞1
𝑁 = 𝑞2
𝑁 =
𝑎𝑏
2𝑏−𝑐
.  
The price combination that maximizes the total of the two firms’ profits is given by 
𝑝∗ ≡ 𝑝1
∗ = 𝑝2
∗ =
𝑎
2𝑏−2𝑐
. It is straightforward to verify that the joint profit-maximizing price 𝑝𝐶 
exceeds the Nash equilibrium price 𝑝𝑁. The corresponding output levels have the reverse 
relationship; 𝑞∗ =
𝑎
2
< 𝑞𝑁 . As in the previous section, we refer to this outcome as collusive. 
The worst payoff of an agreement (𝑝1, 𝑝2) for firm 𝑖 = 1,2 is given by 
(7) 𝑤𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑝2) = min {𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝−𝑖), sup
𝑝−𝑖
′ ∈𝑅−𝑖(𝑝𝑖)
𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝−𝑖
′ )} =
min{𝜋𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑝2), 𝜋𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑅−𝑖(𝑝𝑖))} = {
(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑖 + 𝑐𝑝−𝑖)𝑝𝑖, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 >
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑖 +
𝑐(𝑎+𝑐𝑝𝑖)
2𝑏
) 𝑝𝑖, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖 ≤
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
. 
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Thus, when a player’s price is relatively large compared to the opponent’s price, the player’s 
worst payoff for (𝑝1, 𝑝2) is equal to profit 𝜋𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑝2) for the scenario where the opponent 
follows her part of the agreement. In this case, the opponent’s best response is a price which 
is large relative to the agreement’s prescription. This, in turn, results in a profit which is 
larger than the profit 𝜋𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑝2) under the agreement. Conversely, when a player’s price is 
relatively small compared to the opponent’s price, the player’s worst payoff is equal to her 
profit for the case where the opponent best responds.  
We demonstrate in Appendix that the best-response function of player 𝑖 for the worst 
payoff function 𝑤𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑝2) is given by  
(8)                                   𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝑝−𝑖) =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑎+𝑐𝑝−𝑖
2𝑏
,       𝑖𝑓 𝑝−𝑖 ≤
𝑎
(2𝑏−𝑐)
                              
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
,    𝑖𝑓 
𝑎
(2𝑏−𝑐)
< 𝑝−𝑖 <
𝑎(4𝑏2−𝑐2+2𝑏𝑐)
4𝑏(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
𝑎(2𝑏+𝑐)
2(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
, 𝑖𝑓 𝑝−𝑖 ≥
𝑎(4𝑏2−𝑐2+2𝑏𝑐)
4𝑏(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
 . 
Thus, the best-response function 𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝑝−𝑖) is constant for relatively small values of 𝑝−𝑖 and for 
relatively large values. The functions 𝑅1
𝐹(𝑝2) and 𝑅2
𝐹(𝑝1) are given by the kinked lines that 
pass through points ANDVG and BNEVH, respectively, in Figure 2. Point C in Figure 2 
represents the combination of prices (𝑝1
∗, 𝑝2
∗) that maximizes the total of the two firms’ 
profits. The Nash equilibrium (𝑝1
𝑁, 𝑝2
𝑁) is given by point N in Figure 2. 
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From the definition of a feasible agreement, an agreement (𝑝1
𝐹, 𝑝2
𝐹) is feasible if and 
only if 𝑝𝑖
𝐹 ∈ 𝑅𝑖
𝐹(𝑝−𝑖
𝐹 ) for 𝑖 = 1,2. It follows immediately from this characterization of 
feasible agreements and (7) that the only feasible agreements in the case of Bertrand 
competition are the Nash equilibrium (𝑝1
𝑁 , 𝑝2
𝑁) (point N in Figure 2) and the price 
combination (𝑝1
𝑉, 𝑝2
𝑉) (point V in Figure 2) where the latter is given by:  
(9)      𝑝𝑉 ≡ 𝑝1
𝑉 = 𝑝2
𝑉 =
𝑎(2𝑏+𝑐)
2(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
. 
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Using (4) we obtain that the unique virtual bargaining equilibrium is given by 
(𝑝1
𝑉, 𝑝2
𝑉). We summarize our findings in the following: 
 
Proposition 2:   
(a) The unique VB equilibrium price of the Bertrand game is strictly greater than the NE 
price and strictly smaller than the price vector which maximizes the joint profits of the two 
firms:  
𝑝𝑁 < 𝑝𝑉 < 𝑝∗. 
(b) The joint profits under the VB equilibrium in the Bertrand game are strictly greater 
than the joint profits of the two firms under the NE but strictly smaller than the joint profits 
under the collusive outcome. 
 
This result is in stark contrast with the finding for Cournot competition where virtual 
bargaining leads to the non-collusive Nash equilibrium outcome. Virtual bargaining allows 
the two players to partially collude by raising the price above the Nash level. To see the 
intuition behind this finding, suppose that the players consider moving towards a collusive 
scenario and increasing the prices above the Nash level. Due to strategic complementarity, 
each player realizes that an increase in price will be met by a higher price of her opponent. 
Hence, the worst payoff associated with higher prices will be determined by the scenario 
where the players follow the agreement to increase their prices. Since this is a relatively 
attractive option, the players will favor a collusive price increase. 
 Both the VB and the collusive prices decrease with increases in 𝑏 and decreases in 𝑐 
and the latter price exhibits greater reductions. Thus, the VB price is closer to the collusive 
price (the ratio of the two prices 
𝑝𝑉
𝑝∗
= 1 −
𝑏𝑐
(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
 is large) when the slope of the direct 
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demand curve is large with respect to own price (large 𝑏) and small with respect to the price 
of the competitor (small 𝑐).   
Similarly, both the NE and VB prices decrease with increases in 𝑏 and decreases in 𝑐 
and the latter price exhibits greater reductions. Thus, the NE price is closer to the VB price 
(the ratio of the two prices 
𝑝𝑁
𝑝𝑉
= 1 −
𝑐2
(4𝑏2−𝑐2)
 is large) when the slope of the direct demand 
curve is large with respect to own price (large 𝑏) and small with respect to the price of the 
competitor (small 𝑐). 
The changes in the ratio of the profits under different outcomes with respect to 
parameters b and c mimic the changes in prices. The ratio of the profits under the VB 
equilibrium to the profits under the collusive outcome, 
𝜋𝑖(𝑝
𝑉,𝑝𝑉)
𝜋𝑖(𝑝
∗,𝑝∗)
= 1 −
𝑏2𝑐2
(2𝑏2−𝑐2)2
, increases with 
the slope b of the direct demand with respect to own price and decreases with the slope c of the 
direct demand with respect to the competitor’s price. Analogously, the ratio of the profits under 
the NE to the profit under the VB equilibrium, 
𝜋𝑖(𝑝
𝑁,𝑝𝑁)
𝜋𝑖(𝑝
𝑉,𝑝𝑉)
= 1 −
𝑐4(3𝑏−𝑐)
(2𝑏−𝑐)3(2𝑏+𝑐)(𝑏+𝑐)
, increases 
with b and decreases with c. 
 
5. Comparison with alternative accounts 
It is illuminating to contrast the concept of virtual bargaining with alternative non-Nash 
accounts of strategic behavior, such as the cognitive hierarchy and level-k models (e.g., 
Camerer, Ho, & Chong, 2004; Nagel, 1995; Stahl & Wilson, 1994) and quantal response 
equilibrium (QRE) (e.g., Goeree, Holt, & Palfrey, 2002, 2003; McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995). 
The most crucial difference is that virtual bargaining offers a cognitive account of actors 
being guided by “unspoken agreements” (e.g., Carlin, Lobo, & Viswanathan, 2007; Jones, 
1921). Thus, virtual bargaining makes a distinctive contribution in explaining the underlying 
cognitive mechanism and ensuing behavior. 
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A second important difference is that the standard versions of level-k reasoning and 
QRE rely on players choosing from among discrete alternatives. Virtual bargaining, in 
contrast, enables the players to make continuous choices. In the real world, we can think of 
quantities, prices and effort levels as quasi-continuous measures. Equally importantly, if we 
model such measures as discrete, then the choice of discretization can generate artefacts in 
some theories. For example, a level-k reasoner might draw back from complete collusion by 
k iterations—but whether this corresponds to k cents or k dollars fewer than the completely 
collusive solution depends on the precision with which amounts are defined. 
In addition to these two crucial differences, it is unclear what level-k theory and QRE 
would predict for the competitive settings considered in our paper. We are not aware of any 
published papers that apply these two theories to Cournot and Bertrand competition. In the 
case of level-k reasoning, the predictions would be highly sensitive to the starting point (i.e., 
to the assumption made about level-0). If players face a fine-grained grid of choices (in terms 
of quantities and prices), the level-k prediction will be very close to level-0, because most 
players do not make more than three iterative steps of reasoning (e.g., Arad & Rubinstein, 
2012).  
In the case of QRE, we can view QRE as a “generalization of the Nash equilibrium, 
and it converges to a Nash outcome as [the “error” parameter] µ goes to zero (perfect 
rationality)” (Goeree et al., 2003: 101). QRE’s deviation from Nash equilibria crucially 
depends on the parameter µ, and the predictions for Cournot and Bertrand competition would 
be highly sensitive to the assumption about this parameter. Beyond determining µ, we would 
also need conceptual arguments to clarify whether µ is a universal parameter, or whether it 
should differ for Cournot versus Bertrand settings.  
In sum, we can conclude that virtual bargaining makes a distinctive contribution in 
explaining and predicting collusion in Cournot and Bertrand settings. And these two settings 
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are, of course, foundational for understanding competitive behavior. This discussion should 
not imply that we want to discard level-k reasoning and QRE as models of strategic behavior. 
Both approaches have generated a great many useful insights. Moreover, these models have 
significant explanatory power in many strategic situations. We leave to future research the 
interesting research question of comparing, both theoretically and empirically, level-k 
reasoning and QRE with reasoning based on virtual bargaining.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper offers a novel account of collusive behavior that distinguishes between outcomes 
in Bertrand and Cournot competition. Virtual bargaining contains elements of both non-
cooperative and cooperative reasoning. It sustains collusive outcomes without third-party 
enforcement. Collusion can be a result of virtual bargaining as a mode of reasoning, thereby 
requiring neither communication nor dynamic considerations, such as rewards and 
punishments, between the players. The model provides insights into why collusion in price 
competition can be sustained without communication and why it is hard to detect. 
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Appendix 
Derivation of (6): 
We argued in Section 3 that an agreement is feasible if and only if it a best response for the 
worst payoff function. To determine this best-response correspondence, consider the 
properties of 𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) as a function of 𝑞𝑖. Using (5) we obtain the following. When 𝑞−𝑖 ≥
𝛼
2𝛽+𝛾
, 𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖), as a function of 𝑞𝑖, increases on the interval [0,
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
), has a kink at 
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
, continues to increase on the interval [
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
,
𝛼−𝛾𝑞−𝑖
2𝛽
), achieves its unique maximum 
at 
𝛼−𝛾𝑞−𝑖
2𝛽
, and decreases for the values of 𝑞𝑖 exceeding 
𝛼−𝛾𝑞−𝑖
2𝛽
. When 
𝛼
2𝛽
−
𝛼(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛾
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
< 𝑞−𝑖 <
𝛼
2𝛽+𝛾
, 𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) increases on the interval [0,
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
), has a kink and a unique maximum at 
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
, and decreases for the values of 𝑞𝑖 exceeding 
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
. When 𝑞−𝑖 ≤
𝛼
2𝛽
−
𝛼(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛾
4𝛽(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
, 
𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) increases on the interval [0,
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛼
2(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
), achieves its unique maximum at 
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛼
2(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
, 
decreases on the interval (
(2𝛽−𝛾)𝛼
2(2𝛽2−𝛾2)
,
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
), has a kink at 
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
, and continues to 
decrease for the values of 𝑞𝑖 exceeding 
𝛼−2𝛽𝑞−𝑖
𝛾
. 
Thus, 𝑤𝑖(𝑞𝑖, 𝑞−𝑖) is single-peaked as a function of 𝑞𝑖 for all three possible ranges of 
𝑞−𝑖 spelled out in the preceding paragraph. The unique peak in each of these cases 
corresponds to the best-response function in expression (6).  
 
Derivation of (8): 
Consider the properties of 𝑤𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑝2) as a function of 𝑝𝑖. When 𝑝−𝑖 <
𝑎
(2𝑏−𝑐)
, 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝−𝑖), as a 
function of 𝑝𝑖, increases on the interval [0,
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
), has a kink at 
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
, increases on the 
interval [
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
,
𝑎+𝑐𝑝−𝑖
2𝑏
), achieves its unique maximum at 
𝑎+𝑐𝑝−𝑖
2𝑏
, and decreases for the 
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values of 𝑝𝑖 exceeding 
𝑎+𝑐𝑝−𝑖
2𝑏
. When 
𝑎
(2𝑏−𝑐)
< 𝑝−𝑖 <
𝑎(4𝑏2−𝑐2+2𝑏𝑐)
4𝑏(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
, 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝−𝑖) increases on 
the interval [0,
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
), has a kink and a unique maximum at 
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
, and decreases for the 
values of 𝑝𝑖 exceeding 
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
. When 𝑝−𝑖 >
𝑎(4𝑏2−𝑐2+2𝑏𝑐)
4𝑏(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
, 𝑤𝑖(𝑝𝑖, 𝑝−𝑖) increases on the 
interval [0,
𝑎(2𝑏+𝑐)
2(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
), achieves its unique maximum at 
𝑎(2𝑏+𝑐)
2(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
, decreases on the interval 
(
𝑎(2𝑏+𝑐)
2(2𝑏2−𝑐2)
,
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
), has a kink at 
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
, and continues to decrease for the values of 𝑞𝑖 
exceeding 
2𝑏𝑝−𝑖−𝑎
𝑐
. 
Note that 𝑤𝑖(𝑝1, 𝑝2) is single-peaked as a function of 𝑝𝑖 in all three cases 
characterized in the preceding paragraph. The unique peak in each of these cases corresponds 
to the best-response function in expression (8). 
 
